Abstract: Eristic methods of the Stalinist courts are a phenomenon, on the one hand, well-documented, yet on the other hand, insufficiently explored from the theoretical perspective. They can be understood as forms of violence occurring in the language of the judicial discourse participants (judges, prosecutors), aimed at the total elimination of political opponents. The article is an attempt to characterise these methods using the conceptual instruments, developed by Chaïm Perelman and presented in the work Logique juridique. Nouvelle rhétorique and L'empire rhétorique. Rhéto-rique et argumentation. What weighs in favour of using Perelman's theory are its roots in the abundant achievements of the ancient rhetoric. More importantly, however, one of the main objectives of Perelman was the development of the modern theory of legal argumentation, including judicial one. In this regard, the views of the philosopher are adopted as a counterpoint in the rhetorical analyses of the abuses of the Stalinist courts discussed on the example of the Trial of the Sixteen and the Trial of General A. E. Fieldorf "Nil".
Introduction
The aim of this essay is to present, on the basis of Chaïm Perelman's 1 thought, eristic misuses of politicized judiciary. The foundation constitutes the records of two famous trials during which Polish leaders and combatants of World War II were condemned by Stalinist courts with imprisonment or life sentence. The first of them, the trial of the sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground State abducted to Moscow, is one of the best documented postwar demonstration trials 2 .
On the other hand, the second example -the trial of General A. Fieldorf "Nil", is a characteristic case of "court murder" in Stalinist Poland 3 . Nonetheless, the presentation below is only of an exemplary, illustrative character, taking into consideration that in the years [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] there were a dozen thousand similar politicized trials 4 . The importance of the problem at issue is connected with Perelman's view that legal, and especially judicial argumentation is a model example of all possible kinds of argumentation 5 . . The essay has the following structure: Perelman's theory of argumentation and the notion of eristic will be presented at first. Next, the two abovementioned political trials will be briefly described, constituting the basis for the presentation of eristic misuses. In the subsequent part of the essay the indicated misuses will be characterized in more details, on the basis of Perelman's views as presented in his books 6 For example, on 16 June 1945 in the "Life of Warsaw" there was published an announcement of the Polpress agency which repeated the argumentation used in the indictment in the "Trial of the Sixteen": "The public in Poland indignantly learned of the exploits of Okulicki and his accomplices who were accused of that they organized a diversionary action against the Red Army". Access in: the Jagiellonian Library, reading room of IV and V format magazines, 25. Rhetoric and argumentation] , Wydawnictwo PWN, Warszawa 2002. 9 The term "rhetoric" comes from the Greek noun rhétor, etymologically derived from the form of the verb reo not preserved in the | 11
| Rhetoric of violence.On eristic methods used by Stalinist courts…
Moreover, he claimed that judicial reasoning is of paradigmatic character and constitutes a model example of every practical argumentation 19 . For these reasons Perelman is considered one of the leading contemporary theorists of legal argumentation 20 . Perelman therefore indicated the passage from particular legal discourse to a general argumentation theory. 21 Consequently, on the basis of his thought it is possible to point out rhetoric misuses which were present in the practice of the Stalinist judicature. Moreover, it is possible to link them with the entire propaganda argumentation used in that period 22 . According to Perelman, the measure which is applied to a specific argumentation is its effectiveness in a dispute 23 . 19 Cf. Jerzy Stelmach, Ryszard Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku [The philosophy of law of the nineteenth and twentieth century], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 1998, p. 149. 20 Among the theoreticians of legal argumentation there should be mentioned, in particular, R. Alexy, J. Habermas, R. Dworkin, M. Atienza and P. Ricoeur (in the last period of creation). Cf Kraków 1995, p. 123. 22 As for the relations of the ideology of real socialism with the propaganda rhetoric of the Polish People's Republic in the perspective of anthropological theory, cf. Janusz Barański, "Ideologia i historia albo epos ideologiczny" ["Ideology and history or ideological epic"], in: Socjotechnika, między magią a analogią. Szkice o masowej perswazji w PRL-u i III RP [Social engineering, between Ibidem, Ibidem, p. 159. 28 Perelman writes "(…) it is important to recognize the superiority of the arguments that would be accepted by everyone -namely, by the universal auditorium: so we are saying that we are directing our call to the reason, that we use arguments that should be accepted by every intelligent being" (ibidem, p. 148.) The concept of a universal auditorium is essentially ideal and formal in nature. It was shaped, among others, under the influence of the concept of the transcendental entity and the categorical imperative of I. Kant. After: J. . In other words, guarantees of rationality are included in the construction of universal audience itself, which should be persuaded by the force of more effective, i.e. better argument. The criterion of effectiveness understood in this way is supplemented by Perelman with the postulate of openness for criticism in the course of the discourse and with the requirement of tolerance. One should add that the philosopher agrees for pluralism in the cognition field; consequently, two counter-arguments can be acknowledged by the same audience. In this context, Perelman advocates a "principle of inertia", which should not be rejected without justification for once accepted beliefs. 34 . That is why when discussing the nature of reasoning the philosopher claims that it does not always lead to unequivocal conclusions; it rather justifies conclusions carried out earlier. As a result, also in case of courts, one cannot always talk about one correct and unquestionable decision 35 . All these postulates allow to take a critical insight at the rhetoric of the Soviet judiciary. As it will be discussed below, Stalinist courts could not agree, as a rule, to any pluralistic consequences of argumentation, treating instrumentally the fundaments of rhetoric, such as its discursive character or the requirement of persuading the audience by means of a better argument.
Eristic
At this point, the fundamental difference between rhetoric and eristic should be signalled. From the very beginning of its existence, the latter was understood to be the art of conducting warring disputes (Greek techne eristike is derived from éristike -a quarrel, a dispute), 36 in which there were applied disloyal methods, i.e. sophisms 37 44 . It was the goal of ancient rhetoric and contemporarily it is the goal of Perelman's theory of argumentation 45 . To the contrary, eristic discourse has one goal, i.e. winning, and one criterion to fulfill, neutral from moral point of view -effectiveness 46 . It must be added that Schopenhauer distinguished between logic and dialectics, and within the latter he distinguished the eristic dialectic. In the philosopher's opinion, logic was a "science of the laws of thought", while the dialectic -"the art of debate" 47 . The "eristic dialectic" was supposed to be "a science of innate human desire to be right". At the same time, in Schopenhauer's view, it constituted the art of discussing in such a way as to preserve the appearance of righteousness, i.e. per fas et nefas 48 
.
As discussed above, in Perelman's theory, the effectiveness of argumentation also plays an important role. However, the basic criterion of acceptance of the rhetoric discourse is its reasonability that fulfils the function of the universal auditorium. 49 In addition, the effectiveness in Perelman's theory is limited by the above-mentioned "postulates". Furthermore, in Perelman's theory the requirement of persuading the audience entails respect for often contradictory values 50 .
To the contrary, in eristic there is no similar limitation 51 .
K. Zajdler points out that also in judicial legal practice eristic, unlike rhetoric, is not the art of persuasion by means of reliable methods, but of overcoming the opponent in an oral argument per fas et nefas
52
. The eristic paradigm does not therefore fit into the model of legal argumentation proposed by Perelman, whose final result is to be the compromise, expressed in the operative part of the ruling, "acceptable in a given environment and at a given moment"
53
. Perelman is aware that "in every court case there is disagreement and dispute", yet he believes that the role of the judge is to find a solution that is "reasonable and acceptable, namely neither subjective nor arbitrary"
54
. For the reasoning undertaken in this essay there is crucial a practical temptation of a transfer from rhetoric (in both classic and Perelman's understanding) to eristic, according to which victory in a dispute justifies application of all possible argumentative techniques 55 . He points out that the "eristic turn" in the case of both the Soviet and the Nazi laws allowed the assumption of legal positivism 56 . For example, the thesis on the content of the law made by the will of the sovereign allowed the authorities to subordinate the courts to ideologized laws. This has led to a disturbance in the relationship between the effective application of the law by the "mouth of the law" and the rule of law. In a similar context, Gustav Radbruch writes that positivism believes (…) 
The Stalinist trials
Below there will be presented two model examples of political trials in order to enlighten a context in which eristic replaced rational argumentation in the court discourse of "Stalinist night" 59 .
The trial of "the Sixteen"
The so-called trial of "the Sixteen" was preceded by the arrests, undertaken by NKVD in Pruszków and deportation to Moscow of the leaders of the Polish Underground State 60 . Amongst them there was L. Okulicki, the late commander of the Home Army, the chief of the Armed Forces in the country and J. S. Jankowski, the vice-Prime Minister, the Delegate for the Government in the country 61 . 59 As for the Stalinist period in Poland, see Wojciech Roszkowski, Historia Polski 1914 -1991 [History of Poland 1914 -1991 68 . The prosecution deemed "illegality" of the Home Army and it subjected to utter criticism still internationally recognized Polish emigration government in London 69 . Not surprisingly, the final argumentation reflected the abovementioned "crimes" of these organizations 70 . One should add that the Soviet court-appointed defenders met the accused not earlier than in the courtroom. Moreover, some of the accused were puzzled by their defenders pleadings since the latter condemned their conspiratorial activity and pleaded guilty 71 .
67 The basis of this was art. 58 of the Criminal Code of the USSR of 1926 on the grounds of which people were charged for counter-revolutionary activities.
68 The entire indictment in: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., pp. 8-34.
69 Simultaneously to the trial in Moscow there took place the discussions on the establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity. Nevertheless, diplomatic recognition for the London Government of the Polish Republic in exile was withdrawn by the United States and Great Britain only on July 5, 1945.
70 From the final accusation speech: "From the dark alleys of its dark underground, all these "underground ministers" and members of the so-called "parliament", Okulicki, and others with him, puppets playing with the politics who are now sitting on the bench of criminals, reached their criminal hands trying to put the Red Army's blow in the back", in: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 239. Ibidem, In the trial there were imposed the following penalties of deprivation of liberty: L. Okulicki -10 years; J. S. Jankowski -8 years; S. Jasiukowicz -5 years; A. Bień -5 years; A. Pajdak (in a separate trial) -5 years; K. Pużak -1,5 years; K. Bagiński -1 year; A. Zwierzyński -8 months; E. Czarnowski -6 months; J. Chaciński -4 months; S. Mierzwa -4 months; Z. Stypułkowski -4 months; F. Urbański -4 months. Found not guilty: S. Michałowski, K. Kobylański and J. Stemler.
of March 1953
79 . In the Soviet camp on 22 October 1946 there also died S. Jasiukowicz. The other defendants were subjected after the punishment to various repressions of the communist authorities in Poland 80 .
The Trial of General Fieldorf "Nil"
The second discussed trial is a model example of Stalinist judicial murder and it concerns Polish general, August Emil Fieldorf "Nil" 81 . During World War II he was the commander of the Kedyw (special operations executive) of the Main Headquarter of the Home Army and deputy commander-in-chief under general L. Okulicki 82 . As mentioned above, amongst his activities he established an anticommunist organization "NIE" 83 . In the year 1945 "Nil" was accidentally caught by NKVD and without being recognized was deported to Ural, where he worked for two years in the labour camps 84 . After coming back to Poland he revealed himself, was arrested on November the 9 th 1950 and put in prison 85 . There he was offered a collaboration, consisting, inter alia, of signing appropriate appeal to the previous soldiers of the Home Army to follow communist's authorities 86 . Fieldorf refused and then, before the trial, he was told by the officers of security service that he would be hanged 87 .
79 According to a letter from the MFA of the USSR to the Polish authorities of 3 November 1989, L. Okulicki and J. Jankowski died of heart disease. winning the dispute under the pretext of having good arguments and with the use of all means, both allowed as well as prohibited ones 100 . One can point out four of the most typical eristic methods, namely: 1) using the so-called "eristic expansion", namely behaving and acting in such way as to cause chaos in argumentation and lead to disorientation of the opponent; 2) referring to actual or alleged approval of the public by proving that the opponent's views are inconsistent with the views of this audience, irrespective of the fact whether such inconsistence in fact exists; 3) "fabricating the consequences" which consists in inferring, by means of groundless (false) conclusions, such statements from the opponent's speech which were not in fact included in it; 4) hiding the goal that the argumentation really aims at.
101
These methods were applied, in a representative way, during the abovementioned trials. 
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by the communist courts was also referring to supposedly common social approval of the Red Army liberators and new communist authorities by "the nation" or "the people" 105 . It was one of the most common arguments of the propaganda, justifying the committed political crimes, which, as one can see, followed the scheme of the second of eristic methods. The third method was also used in the courtrooms. Statements about being a member of the Home Army and the authorities of the Polish Underground State, presented by the defendants, constituted the basis to draw the conclusion about anti-Soviet activity or about the murders on civilians and soldiers of the Red Army
106
. This argument was brought to the limits of eristic by connecting the membership in the Home Army with collaborating with the Nazis; the justification of the judgement of capital punishment issued in general Fieldorf "Nil" trial can serve as a model example 107 . Not surprisingly, Stalinists courts to a smaller (like in case of Fieldorf) or to a bigger extent (like in case of the trial of the Sixteen) applied also the fourth eristic method, hiding the real motive of their activity. One should note that the specificity of propaganda carried out in the Stalinist period directed towards the western states, was manifested in acting under the pretext of democratic and fair society 108 . In the field of judiciary it was manifested in maintaining 105 The prosecutor in speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "The Polish nation, grateful to the Soviet people, grateful to the Red Army -its liberator, took its breath away again". After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 244.
106 Public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "We bow our heads in front of the bright memory of hundreds of Red Army officers and soldiers, hundreds of Soviet citizens killed and tormented by criminals from the «the Home Army». We will be forever honouring the memory of major 134 (…) motorized battalion, . The further argument will be divided into three points, devoted to: 1. the role of the auditorium, the truth and the hierarchy of values in the argumentation; 2. the role of authority and discourse in the courtroom; 3. other argumentative methods of the Soviet courts. These issues are not disjoint; in reference to the Empire of rhetoric, however, they allow to sort out the varied aspects of the eristic abuse of the "Stalinist" judicial system.
Auditorium, the truth and the hierarchy of values
According to Perelman's abovementioned opinion, the aim of every argumentation is to win or foster already won audience (…).To reach this goal the speaker must adjust his speech to the audience 111 . Totalitarian power used quite the opposite scheme, preliminarily creating a dependent audience -the defendants, the press, etc.
112
. Perelman stresses that: Adjusting to the audience primarily consists in choosing such premises as argumentation of these thesis which were acknowledged by the audience. 113 At the same time, the philosopher points out that argumentation is correct only when it involves undermining the obvious 114 . From this point of view, in the communist courts, the argumen-| 27 | Rhetoric of violence.On eristic methods used by Stalinist courts… tative process was based on purely parsimonious rhetoric, which underlies the adjustment of the audience to the uttered thesis of accusation. Consequently, courts were able to act under the pretext of common approval of prosecutors' propositions and forced their acknowledgement without the necessity of searching for compromise, of changing argumentation, etc. The degree of the adaptation of the auditorium gathered in the courtroom during the trial of the Sixteen reflects its reaction of ridiculing the accused's statements 115 . The audience was additionally manipulated during the trial, particularly by means of misuses in the sphere of such notions as the truth, fact, supposition and value. Perelman writes: Within the range of the approved propositions among which the speaker chooses the point of departure for his speech, the ones that should be sectioned off, are those which concern reality, namely facts, truths, suppositions; and these which concern most desired things,
namely value[s](…). If we award "fact" or "the truth" with the status of objective element (…) we will be able to assume facts and the truth as unchangeable data, so that a bigger support of the audience for them will not be necessary any more. (…) However, at the moment when a fact or the truth are questioned by the audience, the speaker cannot use them, unless the opponent is wrong or, at least, he notes that there is no reason to take into account his opinion, that is disqualifying the opponent by means of depriving him of the features of a competent and wise interlocutor
116 . In a similar context, Perelman points out in Legal Logic that a wrong qualification of facts can be used in practice to persecute political opponents 117 . One may say in a comment that the Stalinist courts, subordinating the audience, simultaneously imposed arbitrary interpretation of "facts" concerning the activities of the Home Army 115 For example: [Prosecutor] : "The defendant is the chief commander. There was systematic diversionary work carried out in the eastern districts, terrorist acts were undertaken in the rear of the Red Army. Who is responsible for these acts? Okulicki: I am not guilty of this, but I am responsible (laughing in the courtroom)". Similarly, a number of false charges against the defendants in the trial of the Sixteen and against general Fieldorf were formulated by means of suppositions, including those about murdering the civilians and political opponents 120 . One may note that defamatory arguments towards the accused were often formulated in aprioric way 121 . According to Perelman, the argumentation on its basis must appeal to a specific hierarchy of values. The philosopher explains that (…) the word "value" can be always applied in case of doing away with uniformity or equity between things, in any place where one of the things must be situated before or above another, in every place where it is 118 The public prosecutor in the speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "The terrorist-subversive character of the underground troops of the Home Army and «NIE» has been undoubtedly established. They were created for this purpose. Terror, diversion and spying were the basis of the program, if it is at all possible to use the term «program» against the bandits". Ibidem, p. 180. 126 Stalin was given this title on 27 June 1945. 127 Public prosecutor in his speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "the Red Army, in heavy battles, defeated the Nazi war machine and rescued the peoples of Europe from being held down by the Nazi imperialism and saved them from extinction". After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 238.
128 Public prosecutor in his speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "The reactionary Polish "government" in London, in the hands of proNazi elements, has sometimes given the impression that it cannot exercise the will of the nation, but, on the contrary, it pursues its policy so that it always goes along with the Nazi Germany". After: ibidem, p. 242. ". The basis of this rhetoric was a presupposed superiority of communist values over "bourgeois" ones and, in consequence, unquestionable argumentation of Stalinist courts over the leaders of the Polish Underground State.
One remembers that during the discussed trials the courts countered all manifestations of polemics with the presupposed hierarchy of values assumed by the prosecution. Consequently, "the defence" in the trial of the Sixteen accepted all charges formulated in the indictment 133 . Perelman seems to be particularly significant in this context, saying that: The description which seems to be neutral reveals its partiality, when we can contrast it with a different one (…) | 31
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It was Aristotle who pointed out at this phenomenon: Orestes can be called a "matricide", in a different context he can be referred to as "father's avenger". Each of these expressions (…)
shows only one aspect of the reality. Perelman writes in the next sentence as follows: Such descriptions assume certain arrangement in hierarchy performed earlier. (…) Particular classes can be established by means of conjunctions "and" or "neither". Associating one element with another one, we bring them together and we try to find a common denominator for them. 134 Such technique of common denomination was used by the Soviet courts in the presented cases. Since the activities of the Polish Home Army and the Underground State did not reflect the communist hierarchy of values, they were considered to belong to the same category as the actions undertaken by Nazi Germany
135
. The achievement of a "compromise of value" through argumentative discourse was thus excluded by the Stalinist jurisprudence in a priori manner 136 . In summary of this point it should be pointed out that the falsified auditorium, the arbitrary concept of truth, and the imposed hierarchy of values constituted, from the perspective of Perelman's views, the essence of the eristic abuse in the discussed trials.
Authority and discourse
The concept of truth in the argumentative discourse is correlated by Perelman with the issue of the authority supporting it. According to the philosopher, the status of the truth or a fact is not a property given forever unless we assume the 134 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 61. 135 Consequently, in the Soviet newspapers there appeared articles regarding the trial of the Sixteen. "Destroy the agents of Nazi Germany"; "Polish fascist bandits posing for democrats"; "Executioners acting in the name of Hitler". After: N. Davies, Powstanie '44…, op. cit., p. 613.
136 From the justification of the judgment of General Fieldorf: "The Soviet Army was a more dangerous enemy for the capitalist minions than the Nazis, bringing the national and social liberation of the working masses from the Nazi occupant which in fact killed the people and devastated the Polish culture, but was an ally, it did not threaten the possession -in the social battle it was on the same side of the barricade". Reprint of files in: M. Fieldorf, L. Zachuta, Generał "Nil"…, op. cit., p. 333.
existence of authority of a certain divine creature whose statements and revelations would be irrefutable
137
. It should be pointed out that the argument "from authority" is sometimes regarded as decisive also in legal discourse (Argumentum ab auctoritate est fortissimum in lege 138 ). Perelman adds, however, that (…) in the face of the lack of absolute guarantee, in the face of the lack of obviousness or necessity which would suggest itself to every wise being, facts and the truth acknowledged by common opinion or by specialists' opinion can be questioned.
139
The philosopher's abovementioned remarks refer to the mechanism of "truth verification" in totalitarian systems. Also in the courtrooms where the discussed trials took place, Stalin's divine-like authority 140 , based on the foundations of Marxism -Leninism ideology 141 , was a guarantee of pushing through every legally relevant "fact" 142 and "truth" 143 .
137 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 37. 142 The defender in the speech at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "Everyone knows the enthusiasm the Polish nation welcomed the Red Army, everyone knows how much the Red Army has done for the Polish nation". After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 280. 143 The public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "The Red Army, says Comrade Stalin, is an army that defends peace and friendship among nations of all countries. It was created not to conquer other countries but to defend the borders of its country. The Red Army was always respectful of the rights and independence of all peoples". After: ibidem, p. 239.
In the discussed trials, the argumentation based on the Red Army's authority was often used in order to depreciate any action taken by the Home Army and "NIE" 144 . However, Perelman points out that the power of the argumentation ab auctoritate is at the same time its greatest weakness. The argument of authority is valid only in the situation of a complete lack of persuasive evidence. It will constitute the basis of other arguments and the person using them will not overlook any occasion to emphasize the authority which is consistent with its thesis and undermines the thesis of the opponent. Unquestionable authority in the last instance is divine authority.
145
Since the courts mirrored Stalin's unquestionable will 146 the accused could not formulate any effective argument in favour of their defence. It was also consistent with the practice of the Soviet courts, just like in Fieldorf "Nil" trial, of virtually determining the judgments even before the beginning of the trial.
The question of ab auctoritate argumentation in Perelman's conception is related to the question of the possibility of real discourse in which the power of a better argument should prevail. According to the philosopher, there is a danger that discourse -authority relation will become inversely proportional. Perelman emphasizes: Argumentation aims at influencing the listeners, at modifying their beliefs and attitudes by means of speech whose goal is to obtain their 144 The public prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen: "The heroic battle of the Red Army during the Great War of the Nations will stay forever on the cards of world history, as an immortal manifestation of heroism (…) Our victory today is celebrated by all peace loving nations, all those who sincerely desire peace throughout the world and freedom for all humanity (…) And against this heroic army, against the liberating army, there were turned the criminal plans of the defendants. These gentlemen, bypassing the limits of impudence and shamelessness, allowed themselves to call the «Red Army» new occupant". After: ibidem, p. 239. 145 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 112. 146 In a similar context, H. Arendt writes that "in the Nazi Germany, the Führer's will was the source of law, and his order was in force by law". . As pointed out, "social institutions" of the Stalinist system, including courts, did not agree for any discursive interaction; moreover, the attempt of a real defence was understood as an activity aiming to limit the authority of the communist power. H. Arendt writes that the "mark of assurance" of authority is the absolute recognition of those by whom the obedience is demanded; therefore, neither coercion nor persuasion is needed 150 . One may say in this context that Okulicki's self-defence was treated as "blasphemy" and resulted in his retaliatory death in the Soviet prison 151 . In the summary of this point, it should be pointed out that an unrestricted argumentation from authority in connection with the elimination of interactions in the discourse was an effective eristic method used by the Stalinist courts. It is clear that in the rhetorically acceptable court case, the measures applied by the communist prosecutors and judges would discredit the undertaken argumentation. As Perelman writes (…) an attitude which would humiliate the speaker | 35 153 Mutatis mutandis, in cases where a rational legal discourse is possible, the sources of law, common for the participants, objectify the conditions of the trial (both formal and substantive-legal ones). To the contrary, totalitarian sources of law, common for a judge, attorney and prosecutor, in their ideological roots exclude the defendant's right to expect independent defence and they enfeeble his position 154 . Perelman's postulate of pluralism is contrary to the "monolithic" axiology of the totalitarian system of law. Similarly, the inaccessibility [hermeneutic nature] 152 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 29. 153 Ibidem, p. 45. 154 Ideologization of the sources of the Soviet law is well illustrated on the example of criminal law. For example, in 1924, "the Basic Principles of Criminal Law of the USSR and the Republics" were adopted. There was challenged the division into crimes, misdemeanours and offences, and there was introduced a division into offences against the foundations of the Soviet system and all other groups of crimes. of the Soviet sources of law in the trial of the Sixteen caused that an attorney "obtains support" but rather for acknowledging the guilt -presupposed from the beginning -of some accused (Okulicki) 155 .
Formal aspects of court argumentation
What is also worth mentioning are some formal aspects of the argumentation used by the Stalinist courts. This problem also needs to be raised because according to Perelman, the theory of argumentation is procedural in nature 156 . The philosopher writes: Arguments which are quasi-logical are the ones which could be understood by means of comparing them with formal thinking, of logical or mathematical character
157
. It must be pointed out that "quasi-logical" methods, typical for legal positivism 158 , conjoined with a strict proceduralism, were effectively used in the Stalinist trials against ideological enemies 159 . The Soviet judges applied, inter alia, legal syllogism which was to guarantee indisputability of reasoning and to create the pretense of their objectivity 160 . 155 In a defence speech of Bień and Jasiukowicz, the attorney emphasized the guilt of Okulicki: "Okulicki refuses to admit that people here are charged with specific crimes. He tries to prove by any means that the "Home Army" commanded by Okulicki did not fight with the Red Army, which was sufficiently proved by convincing facts. But we know that the matter is different". After: Sprawozdanie sądowe w sprawie organizatorów…, op. cit., p. 279.
156 After: J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa…, op. cit., p. 152. 157 Ch. Perelman, Imperium retoryki…, op. cit., p. 65. 158 As for the problem of the logical character of the methods developed by legal positivism, see J. Stelmach, R. Sarkowicz, Filozofia prawa…, op. cit., , 159 In a similar perspective, G. Radbruch writes about the law of the Third Reich: "(…) positivism, believing that "law means law" has made German legal practice defenceless against law established arbitrarily or with criminal intentions". After: G. Radbruch, Ustawowe bezprawie…, op. cit., p. 249. 160 G. Radbruch also analyses the abuses made by the courts of the Third Reich and draws attention to the formal aspects of legal reasoning. The author cites the opinion of the post-war German prosecutor general: "Legal methods are only the means which a responsible lawyer makes use of whenever he wishes to obtain a judgment with legal justification". After: G. Radbruch, Ustawowe bezprawie…, op. cit., p. 247. 
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Argumentation of efficiency
Last but not least, the Stalinist courts used the argumentation based directly on the concept of efficiency -crucial to eristic. 
Other argumentative techniques
To complement the analysis, one may indicate three other rhetoric methods pointed out by Perelman, which were in practice misused by the communist courts. These were as follows:
-argumentation through intensified example, in plural, "to make that what is singular the value of archetype which induces to generalization". In case of the trial of the Sixteen, these were such expressions as "gangsters", "criminals", "terrorists", "saboteurs", "murderers" 178 , etc.; -argumentation from "anti-pattern", which was used both in the trial of the Sixteen and in general Fieldorf's trial, in order to trigger in the members of the audience the disgust and the urge to be distinguished
179
. For example, in the justification of the sentence in "Nil's" trial, when describing the authorities of the Polish Underground State, there was used the phrase "fascist cabal"
180
. In turn, in the speech of the prosecutor at the end of the trial of the Sixteen there were used the words "blind moles of the underworld", "puppets of marionette playing politics", "puppies" [about President W. Raczkiewicz, General K. Sosnkowski and the Prime Minister T. 
Conclusion
In this essay there were analysed the assumptions of the theory of rhetoric, developed by Chaïm Perelman. They served to discuss the argumentative abuse used by the courts during the Stalinist period. The undertaken characteristics referred to two model examples, namely the demonstration trial of the Sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground State and the "court murder" of General A. Fieldorf "Nil". The point of the argument was the difference between rational rhetoric, aimed at convincing the audience by the power of a better argument and the eristic, aiming per fas et nephas at a complete victory in the dispute.
In view of Perelman's argumentative theory, the eristic abuse of the Stalinist courts consisted of negating the fundamental assumptions of rhetoric. Firstly, they relied on the instrumentation of the auditorium, that is, on the rejection of the mechanism for assessing the rationality of the arguments raised in the discourse in the courtroom. As a result, the prosecution forced through the non-discursive concept of "truth" as well as the "hierarchy of values", justifying the Soviet worldview and legitimizing the prosecution. Secondly, there was applied the technique of argumentation from the indisputable authority (of Stalin, of the Red Army, etc.), which led to the loss of the interaction in the discourse and resulted in a practically impossible defence. The situation of the accused was even more deteriorated by the inaccessibility of ideologized sources of the Soviet positive law. Further techniques used by the communist courts consisted, inter alia, in hiding the ideological content in formalized legal reasoning and in sociotechnical manipulation in the courtroom. Finally (what cannot raise surprise from the perspective of the assumptions of eristic), the Stalinist courts fostered efficiency as the legitimizing value of both the judgments handed down and the actual actions of "the people's authority". These and other signalled abuses of rhetorical techniques have resulted in the exclusion of the adversarial element in court proceedings and in the actual prejudgment before the beginning of the trial.
One could see that the basis of the Stalinist judicial eristic were settled on quite strong foundations. Following Perelman, the presented arguments "established the structure of reality" and because of the coherence with the Soviet "axiological axioms" they were not questionable. The defendants acted against the presupposed "reality", both during the investigation and in the course of the trial; therefore there was no possibility of exempting them from the charges. In this context, there comes to mind H. Arendt's remark that Stalin has questioned one of the last two binding commandments -do not say false testimony 185 . Repeatedly used, the totalitarian thesis has become an argument, settling the court dispute.
In conclusion it should be pointed out that according to Perelman's view, the independent judicial authority is a prerequisite for the existence of the rule of law. According to the philosopher, it corresponds to the tripartite of the authority, the irrevocability of the judges and the prohibition of the existence of special courts 186 . From the perspective of "new rhetoric", in the case of the erosion of the rule of law and the loss of independence by the courts, there arises the danger of their "eristic turn". In these cases, the legal rhetoric, which in Perelman's view is a model for every Therefore, in the presented approach, the eristic methods of prosecutors, judges and even attorneys which violate the rules of rational argumentative discourse 188 , become a form of violence on the part of the totalitarian power 189 . A similar view was expressed, among others, by Paul Ricoeur, affected by the mechanisms of the Nazi propaganda during internment in the POW camp 190 . In his ethical-semiotic analyses, Ricoeur emphasizes that violence can be hidden in language as a function of speech 191 . In that case, according to the philosopher, it is easy to indicate the line descending from the influence, a mild form of "the power over" to torture, the extreme form of abuse 192 . May the understanding of the eristic methods of the Stalinist courts, possible through the research of Ch. Perelman and other argumentative theorists, helped to avoid similar abuse in the future.
